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Abstract  
Anti-virus software has been the main defense against malicious application and will remain so in 
the future. However the strength of an anti-virus product will depend on having an updated virus 
signature and the heuristic engine to detect future and unknown virus. The time gap between an 
exploit appearing on the internet and the user receiving an update for their anti-virus signature 
database on their machine is very crucial. Having a diverse multi-Engine anti-virus scanner in the 
infrastructure with the capability for custom signature definition as part of a defence in-depth 
strategy will help to close that gap. This paper presents a technique of deploying more than one 
anti-virus solution at different layers and using custom anti-virus signature which is deployed in a 
custom proxy solution as part of a defence in-depth strategy.  
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Introduction 
Malicious applications like virus, worm, Trojan, Spamming and phishing tools can infect and 
destroy information in a user’s computer through means that the user utilizes in communicating 
on the internet. Email, File attachment, web surfing or file transfer on the internet either with a 
desktop or a smart phone are just a few of the many ways that potential harmful applications 
called Malware (Norton, 2012) can be introduced into the network. 
 
Security and usability are at two different end of the spectrum. Most of the time security is 
sacrificed for usability and security only becomes a retrofit. The desire to meet market’s demand 
has resulted in the development of software products that are full of security vulnerabilities and it 
takes only a short time before these holes are discovered and exploited (BSI, 2012; Kim, 2012; 
Ryu et al., 2009; CRCR, 2008; TIB, 2004). 
 
It is true but unfortunate that the information protection industry is always one step behind in the 
fight to protect the network and the device it supports from malicious application. In most of the 
cases the black hats community will discover a hole in an application and then look for ways to 
exploit that opening and before long the exploit are being sold to the highest bidder (Sophos, 
2012). 
 
Whenever vulnerability is discovered in an application or operating system, attempt will be made 
by legitimate security engineers and black hats to exploit it and sometimes the exploit may appear 
on the internet. During the time it takes for the anti-virus companies to provide updates for their 
anti-virus signatures and software vendors to release patches the enterprise is at the mercy of the 
malware author. There are cases where vendors deliberately delay in producing a security patch 
for their products because of the high cost involved in providing an immediate patch. 
 
The era of big data is here and companies, even from small to medium scale companies are now 
dealing with data in the size of terabytes. Managing this Hugh amount of data in the face of new 
regulations and the financial implication of data loss has moved the emphasis from data 
accumulation to protecting these sometimes mission critical data. Backup and restore is the 
cornerstone of data protection and the first line of defense (Tom Petrocelli, 2005). 
 
The main concern today is centred in the protection of data from eternal threats, but a large 
percentage of threats often come from people who are the actual custodian of data (CERT, 2012). 
This threat from the malicious insider within the organization tasked with managing computers 
and data repositories is often a difficult problem to address (Elisa Bertino, 2012). We cannot 
solve this problem with the same techniques used for external threats. 
 
Insider threats are from people who are trusted by the organization, they possess the necessary 
authorization and often with elevated user rights. Due to the complex nature of the problem 
insider threats can be divided into three categories: 
 
1. IT Sabotage which involves the use of information technologies to harm the organization. 
2. Theft of IP which is the stealing of intellectual property from the organization and these 
include propriety software, strategies plan and customer information. 
3. Fraud - the use of IT for the unauthorized modification addition or deletion of an 
organization data for personal gain (D. Cappelli, A. Moore and R. Trzeciak, 2012). 
 
At this crucial stage in malware history one can no longer rely and wait for software vendors and 
anti-virus companies to release patches and update their virus signature database. We need to take 
our destiny into our hand and provide our own custom security solution which may include the 
use of multi-Engine and custom anti-virus database definition which we can update, with our own 
malware definition and then layer it in a way to provide end protection at every point in the flow 
of data and information in the enterprise. 
 
The facade of enterprise security 
It is easy to define a security approach that we think will provide adequate security. These 
solutions look perfect on the ground - employee security training, developing secure processes 
and implementing security technologies. These noble solutions have all met with failure as we 
still see them crumbling with the onslaught of cyber-attacks.  
 
These facades of enterprise security result when a security solution does not fit into the defined 
security architecture. The security architecture is for enterprise security what a blueprints is for a 
properly constructed house. In other to have consistent security, security architecture must be 
properly defined. The current approach to security architecture is very generic, concentrating 
primarily on what protocols can be used at a specific tier of the network without attention to 
identity of the user, application, type of data and data interaction. 
 
Therefore to move from this ineffective risk mitigation driven solution, a security architecture 
will take into consideration the organizations network infrastructure, system architecture, 
applications, and data that needs to be designed, implemented and secured, processes, 
applications, user roles and users. (Aaron Woody, 2013) 
 
The correct security architecture will result in an enterprise security solution that can be 
compared to a house that blends well with the external neighbourhood but provide a unique 
interior. 
 
There are numerous vendors out there with hardware and software solutions that claim to provide 
complete security but fail when the threat is from inside. A custom enterprise security 
architecture that would be effective in combatting the malicious outside and insider threats would 
include the following attributes when implementing such a program (George j. Silowash, 2013). 
 
1. Monitor Phone Activity Logs to Detect Suspicious Behaviors. 
2. Monitor and Control Privileged Accounts. 
3. Monitor and Control External Access and Data Downloads. 
4. Protect Critical Files from Modification, Deletion, and Unauthorized Disclosure. 
5. Disable Accounts or Connections upon Employee Termination. 
6. Prevent Unauthorized Removable Storage Mediums. 
7. Understand All Access Paths into Organizational. 
 
Defense in-depth 
Defence in-depth involves the building of different layers or barriers (Ahmad et al, 2012; Smith, 
2003) of protection around an asset or group of assets in order to reduce the effect of unlawful 
exploitation. It involves the use of policies, operation, human, legal and technical elements (NSA, 
2012) such that if one layer fails, is taken out or proven to be inadequate another layer of defence 
will prevent a complete breach. Although we always think of protecting information as it flows 
through the communication path, it may be more practical to deal with data and information 
security at the three possible stages of data and information, namely at rest, in motion and data at 
the perimeter (Dauch et al., 2009). 
 
Although the origin of defence in-depth is military with the use of a watchtower, walls, moat, and 
trenches to create a fortress, its application has found its way into information security whereby 
we are protecting an information zone which is the boundary or perimeter surrounding the flow 
of private data and information and the systems that process the information and data. This 
boundary has become very difficult to define and defend as it is always expanding and 
contracting. 
 
Years ago the information security boundary could be a small office or group of offices within a 
geographical confine with properly defined perimeters. Today with the help of advance 
technology employees can carry out their businesses while telecommuting and their location 
could be at the airport, hotels, taxies or cafes. Given this expanding perimeter it has become 
difficult to employ traditional protective method.  
 
Businesses have suffered greatly when mobile device containing sensitive data are lost or stolen. 
There has been case of theft of confidential information while employees are connected to public 
wireless access point. 
 
A good real-world example where defence in-depth can be useful but rarely applied is in the 
protection of data that travel between various servers’ components in the enterprise. Most 
companies throw up a corporate wide firewall to keep intruders out. Then they will assume that 
the firewall is good enough and let their application server talk to their database in clear text 
(Barnum & Gegick, 2012).   
 
Assuming that the data in question are important, what happens if an attacker manages to 
penetrate the firewall? If the data are also encrypted, then the attacker won't be able to get at them 
without breaking the encryption, or (more likely) breaking onto one of the servers that stores the 
data in an unencrypted form. If we throw up another firewall, just around the application this 
time, then we can protect ourselves from people who can get inside the corporate firewall. Now 
they'd have to find a flaw in some services that our application's sub-network explicitly exposes 
something we're in a good position to control. This is the main reason that defence in-depth is 
more of common sense or a best practice framework than a complete product. As the attacker is 
moving through the host and network looking for holes to exploit there will surely be artefacts 
left behind no matter how meticulous the attacker may be. With a proper audit system in place 
the keen system administrator can be notified in realtime whenever suspicious activities are 
registered. When Microsoft spent time in implementing first class auditing in it core operating 
system it was thinking of auditing as part of a defense in-depth strategy (Shimonski, 2012). 
 
Defence in-depth can be applied in any area where there are data flows and a perfect example is 
packets moving through the network. With the packets flowing between different points, different 
routing decisions are made. Defence in-depth can be applied through a protection against any 
attempts to fool firewalls, intrusion detection system and other network protection device 
(Aigbodi, 2010). 
 
As shown in the figure below the software architecture is made up of components which cover 
three layers of protection between the public hostile network and the private internal network. 
The packet filtering component serves two special purposes: provides network address translation 
between the public and the private network and protects the perimeter between the outside public 
and the private inside. The filter can make decisions based on the source and destination address 
and the port.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Defence in-depth on Network Packet and Protocol Stack. 
 
As shown in the figure below a typical defence in-depth strategy would usually be divided or 
grouped along the following security domain with six different levels where security can be 
applied: 
 
1. Policies and security awareness. 
2. Perimeter. 
3. Internal Network. 
4. Host. 
5. Application. 
6. Data and information. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A typical Defence In-depth Structure. 
 
Implementation of defence in-depth can be seen in every area where there are people and 
information systems with a connection to the public internet. From small and medium scale 
companies, large corporations and even governments’ critical infrastructures and existing 
SCADA systems are being restructured to fight against the effect of cyber terrorism using 
defence in-depth strategy. There are also products’ vendors that provide security solutions with 
this holistic view of security protection to the entire enterprise although they may not use the 
term - ‘defence in-depth’. 
 
Cisco has been in the forefront of providing defence in-depth solution to major companies that 
are required by legislation to provide transparency in business. Cisco provides such businesses 
with a defence in-depth solution using its commercial product and sometimes that of its partners 
based on their solution called SAFE - “Security Blueprint for Enterprise Networks” (Convery & 
Trudel, 2012). 
 
SAFE is not a product but a best guideline from Cisco providing best practise information to 
interested parties in terms of designing and implementing secure networks. It takes a layered 
approach to security where a failure of one security system is not likely to lead to the compromise 
of the network resource. 
 
Microsoft Forefront is a technology that offers a layered solution to the Microsoft network 
(Stanek, 2012). It is a multi-layered suit of products which include the following: 
 
1. Forefront for Office Communication Server. 
2. Forefront Identity Manager. 
3. Forefront Endpoint Protection. 
4. Forefront Threat Management Gateway. 
5. Forefront Unified Access Gateway. 
6. Forefront Online Protection for Exchange Server. 
7. Forefront Protection for Exchange Server. 
8. Forefront Protection for SharePoint. 
 
With this group of products a defence in-depth solution can be built to provide complete 
protection for end computers, communication and collaboration servers and enterprise networks. 
 
While the above two examples are commercial products with a heavy high price tag that is way 
off the league of some companies like those of non-profits, small and medium scale companies, 
the principle can be applied using open source solutions. 
 
This paper will demonstrate that implementing a complete defence in-depth strategy is still 
possible with companies that do not have a budget and resources like the giant enterprises. We 
shall demonstrate how defence in-depth can be applied in the enterprise to protect against 
portable executable files (PE) and how a custom antivirus signature can be placed in different 
parts of the enterprise software to detect malicious executable files - whether received as email 
attachment or delivered as embedded shell code in internet communication. Also, it is worth 
mentioning that there are different approaches for implementing a custom malware signature 
generating system; the approach is mostly dependent on the targeted layer of the application 
protocol. For example (Perdiscia et al., 2013) uses network-level behavioural malware clustering 
to generate malware signatures. 
 
Creating custom anti-virus signature 
While most anti-virus software is proprietary and closed to modification we do have a few open 
source anti-virus solutions that can be used for our intended purpose. In this paper we are using 
the popular cross-platform Clam Antivirus (ClamAV) which is an open source antivirus software 
from Sourcefire. ClamAV prides itself as having been the first to identify a signature for 2003’s 
MyDoom Virus allowing it to be detected and eradicated earlier than any commercial virus 
solution. 
 
Aside from possessing the ability to perform functions that can be found in other anti-virus 
products, it is the ability to create custom virus signature that makes clamAV standout. With 
ClamAV one can create new signatures and detect new threats to the enterprise. There is the 
added advantage that ClamAv can be installed to run side by side with other commercial product 
and if possible convert some signatures to clamAV virus signature format. 
 
ClamAV was designed originally as an email attachment antivirus scanner to detect malicious 
email but it can also be used as a regular anti-virus. It can decompress archives (e.g., rar, zip, 
gzip, bzip2 and cab) and scan Linux mailboxes (mbox, MailDir, and raw emails), and it supports 
on-access scanning on Linux and FreeBSD. However it has the ability to be used as a standalone 
malware scanner that can be deployed in any host whether as server or as a work station 
application with the ability to be run from the command line interface. 
 
There are third party websites that specialize in providing enhanced ClamAV signatures against 
email messaging system from phishing, fake lottery, Ecard malware, Fake job, Porn and other 
general spam. They provide free daily signatures to the web community that are of quality 
standards which can be used for personal or commercial purposes. 
 
As an anti-virus tool kit it becomes easy to build clamAV on any POSIX-compatible system with 
a C compiler. It meshes perfectly well with any of POP3, Samba and web servers as well as any 
message transfer agent (MTA). These abilities of ClamAV make it a perfect candidate for a well 
thought out defence in-depth strategy. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distributed malware service. 
 The figure above shows the different hosts in the network benefiting from a distribution of anti -
virus service based on ClamAV. The service can be specialized based on the nature and type of 
server application. The case of the desktop computer is different from the others because due to 
encryption and encoding some malware may be able to invade network detection and its true 
intent becomes available only at the application endpoint which in most cases is the browser. 
With a browser plugging that can provide scanning capability when the file is open or decrypted 
the malware can still be discovered before it exploits the intended vulnerability. 
 
File scanning to match against existing virus signature is the main job of the antivirus software 
but due to its limitation in detecting zero day or future malware with no signature, behavioural 
analysis are being added to antivirus programs. However, this analysis has its own weakness. 
First, one has to differentiate between normal behaviour and abnormal behaviour. This 
behavioural approach is difficult because we have both suspicious and malicious behaviour; 
when a suspicious behaviour is detected there must be further investigation to reduce false 
alarms.  
 
The best method to reduce false alarms is to run the suspect file in an emulating or visualized 
environment to confirm its true nature and the author's intent. However we do not always have 
this luxury at our disposal hence we have to look for another alternative solution to the problem. 
The alternative approach used in this paper is to determine the true nature of the executable files 
by examining anomalies in the lower level attributes of the file (Yonts, 2012).   
 
The windows executable file format also known as PE/COFF (Portable Executable /Common 
Object File Format) files are by far the popular choice used by malware authors to distribute 
malicious applications to the desired destination. PE/COFF files include but are not limited to the 
popular executable(.exe), dynamic link library(.dll) ActiveX controls(.ocx) amongst others. 
When faced with these files it may become difficult to tell suspicious file from malicious files, 
but by examining the attributes of the file header and other attributes one can reduce the level of 
false alarms.  
 
Popular criteria include but are not limited to files with: 
 
1. TLS entries. 
2. Resource directories. 
3. Suspicious IAT entries. 
4. Suspicious entry point sections. 
5. Sections with zero-length raw sizes. 
6. Sections with extremely low or high entropy. 
7. Invalid timestamps. 
8. File version information. 
 
Armed with this information a security researcher can begin to collect information for a database 
of behaviour and heuristic for input into a custom ClamAV signature. The structure of the 
ClamAV signature format is given below: 
 
SigName:Target:Offset:HexadecimalSignature 
 SigName is a unique string describing the particular signature, the Target field can range from 0 -
9 where, 
 
 0  =  Any file type 
 1  =  windows PE 
 2  =  OLE  
 3  =  Normalized HTML 
 4  =  E-mail file 
 5  =  Image file 
 6  =  ELF 
 7  =  Normalized ASCII 
 8  =  Unused 
 9  =  Mach-0 binaries 
 
The Offset value can be anything from a wild card to specific offset in a file. The last part of the 
signature format is a hexadecimal hash representation of the particular string. ClamAV comes 
with a command line tool called sigtool which can convert a string to hexadecimal representation. 
 
With this signature format and the signature generating tool one can start to build a program that 
can create custom ClamAV signatures from header attributes that can be saved in a signature 
database and be distributed from a centralized location. 
 
The figure below shows a custom ClamAV signature generator creating different signatures that 
can be tailored to the needs of the specific host and application. 
 
 
Figure 4. ClamAV Custom Antivirus Architecture. 
 
The design of a simple signature generating application is just the beginning to a world of 
opportunities. With the number of spamming and phishing sites increasing, having a browser 
plugin that can scan the URL and determine whether the site being visited is malicious, is another 
layer of protection. Although there are current browsers plugin from most anti-virus vendors, the 
messages these applications generate are so generic that the user is only warned about the nature 
of the site but no specific message that would enable the user to make an informed choice. With a 
custom anti-virus solution, the user can be provided with specialized information that will show 
the user the consequences of their actions.  
 
The development of a browser anti-virus plugin could begin first by using ClamAV own support 
for Google Safe Browsing Database (Google, 2012) which get updated regularly. This database is 
included with ClamAV and when enabled, it will provide the following added benefits: 
 
1. Warnings that appear before the user clicks if it leads to malware-infected pages.  
2. The plugin can have access to Google list of suspected phishing and malicious pages. 
3. For companies with public sites it will prevent their sites from being used as a vector to 
infect visitors. 
 
Custom proxy solution 
All of the above services are good enough for the general public but when it comes to the more 
targeted attacks more is needed (Owasp, 2013; Bao & Cao, 2013). On a daily bases as more and 
more malicious applications and urls are detected, malware authors are coming up with new ways 
to exploit the software vulnerabilities. To cope with this ongoing onslaught it is ultimate 
requirements to install a security proxy solution that can ensure that exploit that goes unnoticed 
by protection mechanism like the safe browsing API can be detected before it exploits the web 
client browser. This is especially true of Advance Persistent threat (ADT) which is the latest and 
the most advanced form of attack and are proving very difficult to defend against. Protecting 
against these forms of attack may result in a complicated defence solution (Damballa, 2013). The 
problem with ADT is that they sometimes target the trust relationship that exist within the 
environment and are stealthier and more sophisticated using insidious social engineering 
techniques to quietly penetrate your organization forcing it to deploy customized malware that 
can live undetected for months (TrendMicro, 2013). The custom proxy solution could intercept 
both the request and the response between any internet applications. Any raw responses that may 
contain malicious content design to exploit vulnerabilities on the client browser are either 
removed or modified thus reducing their impact. The proxy solution could call any other security 
module to provided support and from time to time more modules could be added to deal with 
circumstances that affect the business. The authors have implemented a browser plugin in Firefox 
that adds a context menu to all URLs on the Firefox browser, enabling the user to personally send 
and receive information about any content which requires link enabling. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, a strategy to implement defence in-depth with custom anti-virus signature that can 
be deployed in a custom proxy solution was presented to combat the ever changing landscape of 
protection from malicious application. The solution is not too difficult or expensive to design and 
the entire tool used is easily available and the technique has been in existence for some time. 
With this type of strategy the technique can be expanded to cover not only PE/COFF file but any 
other files’ format or any other heuristic technology that the user may see fit to create a scanning 
engine. Future development could include design of special proxies not only for the Http protocol 
but for others that can be easily exploited. 
 
One of the beauties of this solution is that it can be combined with any other anti-virus’ solutions 
that may exist in the environment. With this technique, the security administrator or researcher 
can take the protection of the enterprise to the next level. 
 
The problem dealing with the more recent advanced persistent threats and the complex nature of 
client side application would never go away. The design of custom application proxies that can 
be dynamically updated to provide client side protection to augment already existing security 
solution becomes a must. Implementing a sandbox environment for network aware applications 
to curtail the impact of any exploit is the holy grail of information security. 
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